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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID WESTLY AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHER-
HOOD OF POLICE OFFICERS, 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
vs. 
BOARD OF CITY COM-
MISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE 
CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 14842 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a civil action filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, in which the plaintiffs sought a 
declaratory judgment and injunction against Salt 
Lake City Corporation on the basis of the plaintiffs' 
rights under Utah Code Annotated 34-19-1 (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial judge, the Honorable Jay E. Banks of 
the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
granted the respondent's Motion to Dismiss with 
prejudice the complaint for failure to state a cause 
of action on October 21, 1976. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants- petitioners, seek to have 
the trial court's order dismissing the complaint 
with prejudice reversed and the case remanded to 
the Third District Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant, Dave Westly, is a police 
officer employed by Salt Lake City Corporation 
and president of appellant, labor union, Local 
470 of the International Brotherhood of Police 
Officers. (R2) 
On June 30, 1976, the defendant, Board of 
Salt Lake City Commissioners, passed Bill No. 116 
of 1976 an ordinance amending Subsection (a) of 
Section 25-4-6 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City in which the Respondent implemented a 5% across-
the-board salary increase for all city employees· (R2) 
Prior to June 30, 1976, appellant, Local 470, 
by and through its agent, Thomas Jensen, had communicated 
the local' s desire to initiate the procedure established 
in the past by the parties of meeting and discussing the 
-2-
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the issue of yearly changes in wages, salaries and 
benefits. (R6) On or about June 3, 1976, the Local 
tendered to representatives of the respondent proposals 
of the Local relative to wages, salary and fringe 
benefits for the fiscal year 1976. (R6) 
The respondent did not respond in any manner 
to the Local's proposal and neither the Board nor any 
of its Agents make any official effort to meet with, 
discuss, or to negotiate with the Local 470, until 
two (2) days prior to the date of the statutory dead-
line for the adoption of the budget of Salt Lake City 
Corporation. (R6) 
At the meeting on June 30, 1976, in which the 
salary schedule ordinance was enacted, Thomas Jensen, 
as representative of the International Brotherhood of 
Police Officers, Local 470, communicated to the Board 
the Local's intention to reject and waive as a concerted 
activity the 5% salary increase passed by the Board. (R3) 
On July 1, 1976, the members of the Local voted 
in a meeting to express their dissatisfaction as a group 
by refusing the 5% salary increase in reliance on the 
Board's approval of the waiver in the June 30, 1976 
meeting. (R3) 
Forms for implementing the waivers were accepted 
by agents of the Local at 12:30 P.M. on July 2, 1976 
Wh" h ic were drafted by the agents of the respondent. (R4,9) 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
When received by the appellant the waiver forms had 
no requirement that they would have to be witnessed 
by a member of the Salt Lake City Auditor's Office. 
(R4) The forms were distributed to members of the Local 
who immediately began to execute the waiver forms. (R4) 
Subsequently, at the end of the day on July 2, 
1976, the respondent issued an Order that any waiver 
must be witnessed by a member of the Auditor's Office. 
(R4) Prior to this time, no indication was given to 
the appellant Local, concerning this requirement. 
On July 9, 1976, the appellant, Dave Westly, 
as president of the appellant,Local, tendered to Ted 
Perry, Payroll Director and Lynn J. Marsh, Personnel 
Director, and Lawrence A. Jones, Auditor, as agents 
of Salt Lake City Corporation waiver forms signed by 
members of the Local, but not witnessed by a member of 
the Auditor's Office. (R4) The respondent agents 
refused to accept the signed waiver forms. (RS) 
On July 6, 1976, the Respondent Board ordered 
that the appellant, Dave Westly, could no longer conduct 
any Union business during the time in which the employee 
was also employed by Salt Lake City Corporation. (RS) 
Pre¥ious to this unilateral change, the appellant was 
allowed to spend up to four hours of each workweek engaged 
in "Local" activity. (RS) 
The appellants-petitioners filed this action 
-4-
• 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake county to enjoin any further violations by the 
respondent of the appellants' rights to act in a 
concerted activity for the benefit of the membership 
of the Local and the appellants' rights to designate 
representatives and to organize for their benefit, as 
their rights are expressed and protected by Utah Code 
Annotated 34-19-1 (1953). 
I. 
THE MEMBERS OF LOCAL 4 70 AS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
ARE PROTECTED UNDER UTAH CODE A.~OTATED 34-19-1 (1953) 
FROM ACTS OF THE RESPONDENT WHICH INTERFERE WITH THEIR 
BASIC RIGHTS TO DESIGNATE REPRESENTATIVES AND THEIR RIGHTS 
OF ASSOCIATION AND SELF-ORGANIZATION. 
Utah Code Annotated 34-19-1 (1953) states: 
"Declaration of policy--In the inter-
pretation and application of this 
chapter, the public policy of this 
State is declared as follows: 
(1) It shall not be unlawful for 
employees to organize themselves into 
or carry on labor unions for the purpose 
of lessening hours of labor, increasing 
wages, bettering the conditions of members 
or carrying out the legitimate purposes 
of such organizations as freely as they 
could do if acting singly. 
(2) The labor of a human being is 
not a commodity or article of commerce. 
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws 
shall be construed to forbid the existence 
and operation of labor, agricultural or 
horticultural organizations instituted 
for the purpose of mutual help and not 
having capital stock or conducted for 
profit, or to forbid or restrain individual 
members of such organizations from lawfully 
-5-
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carrying out the legitimate object 
thereof; nor shall such organizations 
or membership in them be held to be 
illegal combinations or conspiracies 
in restraint of trade under the anti-
trust laws. 
(3) Negotiations of terms and 
conditions of labor should result from 
voluntary agreement between employer 
and employee. Govea:-nmental authority 
has permitted and encouraged employers 
to organize in the corporate and other 
forms of capital control. In dealing 
with such employers the individual un-
organized worker is helpless to exercise 
actual liberty of contract and to protect 
his freedom of labor and thereby to 
obtain acceptable terms and conditions of 
employment. Therefore, it is necessary 
that the individual employee have full 
freedom of association, self-organization, 
and designation of representatives of his 
own choosing to negotiate the terms and 
conditions of his employment, and that 
he shall be free from the interference, 
restraint or coercion of employers of 
labor, or their agents, in the designation 
of such representatives or in self-organ-
ization or in other concerted activities 
for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or their (sic) mutual aid or protection. 11 
The trial court dismissed the appellants' 
complaint, finding that the above quoted section 
"was not intended and in fact does not vest any 
rights of collective bargaining in the petitioners. 11 
(R22) 
The appellants submit that the above quoted 
section, commonly known as the little Norris-LaGuardia 
Act grants to the members of the appellants,Local, basic 
rights of self-organization and association and protects 
the ability to engage in certain concerted activity to 
-6-
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advance their lawful purposes free from illegal 
interference, restraint and coercion by employees. 
While this section may not necessarily include 
a grant of full scale"collective bargaining" as 
that term is understood in the private sector, Section 
34-19-1 does extend to all employees of the State of 
Utah certain enumerated rights and privileges. See 
for example, State Board of Regents v. United Packing-
house Food Workers, 175 N. W. 2d 110 (Iowa 1970) as to 
the difference between the definition of the term 
collective bargaining in the private versus the public 
sector. 
In the case of Krystad v. Lau, 400 P. 2d 72 
(Wash. 1965), the Supreme Court of Washington held 
the little Norris-LaGuardia Act of that State granted 
to employees an affirmative, substantive right to 
be free from interference, coercion or restraint by 
employers in their participation in Labor Unions and 
was not merely a statement of policy. In this case, 
the Court extensively disc.ussed the legislative history 
of the little Norris-LaGuardia Act. 
Prior to the Supreme Court of Washington's 
holding in Krystad, that state had never adopted any 
comprehensive labor-management relations statute to 
deal with labor relations problems in private industry, 
which were not covered by the jurisdiction of the federal 
-7-
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labor law. The Court found that a "no man's land" 
existed between federal jurisdiction on the one side and 
the state's conunonlaw jurisdiction on the other which left 
certain employees unprotected. 
The Washington Court voted that the little 
Norris-LaGuardia Act had changed the conunon law under 
which Unions were .not only unlawful but were held to be 
essentially a criminal conspiracy where employees 
had neither the right to organize or join. 
The Court was then faced with the issue of 
whether the little Norris-LaGuardia Act should be deemed 
purely an anti-injunctive statute, or whether it 
reached further in purpose and confered a substantive 
right. The Court answered this question in the 
affirmative, finding that the statute had secondary 
purposes other than limiting the Court's power to issue 
injunctions. 
The Court found that the language of the Act 
when read in light of the assertive declaration of 
the Act, implied the conclusion that the language of the 
Act granted a substantive right to employees to be free 
from coercion, interference or restraint. 
In the appellants' case, other than the rights 
of the members of the Local protected by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, Board of 
Education of Scottsdale v. Scottsdale Education Asso~' 
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17 Ariz. App. 504, 498 P. 2d 578 (1972), public 
employees in the State of Utah are not afforded any 
significant protection in relation to their interests 
of self-organization. A situation exists in the State 
of utah similar to that presented to the Washington 
supreme Court in Krys tad v. Lau; that is a ~no_ man's 
land" exists as to the status of public employees between 
the comprehensive labor system in private sector of 
the economy on the one hand, and the vague and indefinite 
common law concerning public employees on the other. 
If this Court does not include the appellants within the 
basic organizational rights contained in Section 34-19-1, 
the appellants, as well as other public employees, in the 
State will be deprived of any significant protection of 
their rights to engage in concerted activities to advance 
their legitimate interests. 
In the present case, the appellants were deprived 
of their rights under Utah Code Annotated 34-19-1 (1953) 
by the respondent's refusal to conduct any meaningful 
negotiation with the appellant, Local's, representative. 
The course of conduct followed by the respondent interfered 
with, restrained and coerced the appellants' right to 
designate representatives and to organize for the 
Purpose of collective bargaining and their mutual aid 
and protection. 
The appellants should have a remedy for the 
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arbitrary, unilateral action of the respondent in ordering 
that the appellant, Dave Westly, could no longer conduct 
union business during the time he was employed by 
the respondent. 
Also, the members of appellant, Uion, were deprived 
of their ability to organize in concerted activity, 
through the means of the waiver of the pay increase 
which was granted without any intentional obstruction 
by the respondent. 
In light of the fact that the appellant, Local' s, 
members could not employ the concerted activity of 
a strike, the symbolic waiver of the pay increase was at the· 
the only viable means to advance their interests in mutual 
aid and protection. 
THEREFORE, the appellants submit that the trial 
Court's order dismissing the cause of action with prejudice 
should be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court 
for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this day of April, 1977. 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
321 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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